Introduction
Cybersecurity has been commonly associated with three aspects of information technology "people, process, and technology" (Andress, 2003) . People as users and creators of information and technology systems and defined organizational processes clearly affect the ability of any technological environment to be secured. Indeed, some would argue that convincing users to utilize secure processes when handling government information is the key solution to cybersecurity issues. Others argue that technological solutions are most important because they have the ability to define border environments as well as control the behavior of users within those environments.
Increasingly, there is recognition that it may be impossible to control the movement of data and that effective processes and data management are keys to security risk management. Will Pelgrin, director and chief cybersecurity officer of New York's State Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Coordination, recently summed up the challenge: "[A] few short years ago we had a well defined perimeter…. [I] t has now dissolved-our job is to protect data that is resident with each and every one of us" . In 2008, a task force coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security defined the profession by publishing a document that defines the essential body of knowledge for cybersecurity (Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber Security Division, 2008) . It provides an outline of information security roles and competencies for IT management including the CISO, CIO, and other IT professionals. A list of the 14 essential areas of expertise is presented in Appendix I.
Federal Concerns about Cybersecurity
Concerns about the security of computer systems were raised in 1976 by Thomas Rona, who saw the potential threat to information technology (Rona 1976) . As the use of technology grew, concern for security of systems and data within increased. Starting with the Clinton Administration in 1998, successive presidents have devoted increased attention to cybersecurity.
Clinton Administration
Federal recognition of the cybersecurity threat came in May 1998, when the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 63, instructing
Definition of Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity can simply be defined as security measures being applied to information technology to provide a desired level of protection. The issue of protection can be defined using the acronym CIA for Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability:
• Confidentiality refers to the property that data should only be viewable by authorized parties.
• Integrity refers to the principle that only authorized users are allowed to change data, and that these changes will be reflected uniformly across all aspects of the data.
• Availability refers to the principle that data and computer resources will always be available to authorized users.
Source: Conklin, Art and Gregory B. White. e-Government and Cyber Security: The Role of Cyber Security Exercises. Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Kauai, Hawaii. January 4-7, 2006. federal agencies to take steps to reduce the vulnerability of computer systems and communications networks. The directive was also intended to implement measures to mitigate threats to the commercial sector. These included:
• Appointment of a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism in the National Security Council staff, whose duties included overseeing the development of cybersecurity policy
• Establishment of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in the FBI, with responsibility for coordinating reports of computer crime and attacks
• Establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) to coordinate the government's efforts to protect its own vital infrastructure, integrate federal efforts with those of local government, and promote public understanding of threats (Berkowitz and Hahn p. 3) President Clinton appointed Richard A. Clarke as the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism, a Cabinet-level position. Clarke had worked in the State Department during the Reagan Administration, and President George H.W. Bush appointed him as chairman of the Counter-terrorism Security Group and to the United States National Security Council (NSC). During his tenure, the CIAO created and released the National Plan for Information Systems Protection Version 1.0: An Invitation to a Dialogue, a report that set forth the Administration's vision for addressing emerging threats.
Bush Administration
The George W. Bush Administration acknowledged the importance of cybersecurity and retained Clarke as a special advisor in the NSC, although his position was no longer at the Cabinet level. House, 2009) . The report signals the continued importance of cybersecurity, stating clearly. " [T] hreats to cyberspace pose one of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century for the United States and our allies." The report outlines seven key points:
• Cyberspace underpins almost every facet of modern society and provides critical support for the U.S. economy.
• The status quo is no longer acceptable.
• A national dialogue on cybersecurity must begin today and government, with industry, should explain the challenge so that the American people appreciate the need for action.
• The United States cannot succeed in securing cyberspace if it works in isolation; public-private partnerships as well as international collaboration are necessary.
• The federal government has the responsibility to protect and defend the country, and all levels of government have the responsibility to ensure the safety and well being of citizens.
• Working with the private sector, performance and security objectives must be defined for next-generation infrastructure.
• The White House must lead the way forward.
The Cybersecurity Policy Review conveys a strong signal about the significance of cybersecurity and recognizes its importance to all levels of government and the private sector. Furthermore, it coincides with state level assessments by chief information officers (CIOs), who found that cybersecurity ranked sixth among top ten priorities in a 2010 survey conducted by the National Association of Chief Information Officers.
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This renewed interest in cybersecurity by the White House and among top state and local officials comes at a crucial time. All levels of government are challenged by decreases in revenues, and evidence indicates that the current fiscal environment is unprecedented and severe. How will governments improve their cybersecurity profile in these tight fiscal times? Cybersecurity stands at the forefront of these pressures as the scope of security expands and the resources to address security issues do not. The current condition of the states requires that we continue to work smarter in all areas of information technology.
This report asserts that the professional expertise of information technology employees who focus on security issues is a critical asset for governments at all levels. Making the most of that asset in itself and leveraging it for other fiscal benefits for the state represent important strategies in meeting the current challenge.
Adding to the strain on fiscal and personnel resources, the federal government's Chief Information Officer, Vivek Kundra, has elevated the priority of transparency regarding IT spending of government stimulus funds (Towns, 2009) . Recognizing the importance of this initiative to democratic accountability, Kundra will continue asking state and local governments to post data on the web related to stimulus spending. Additionally, in an effort toward further cooperation on transparency issues, the National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) is actively working with Kundra. While it challenges resources, this quest for openness provides further reason for cybersecurity professionals to provide more robust approaches to data management and protection.
State Concerns about Cybersecurity
Pressures to elevate cybersecurity as a national priority pose challenges for cybersecurity professionals. Whereas organizing for cybersecurity at the federal level has taken shape within the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense, 2 states have had varied success in establishing links between cyber protection and physical security, as well as in integrating cyber security into overall state infrastructure planning. Their varied success stems from several issues:
• First, many state offices of homeland security have only recently incorporated personnel with expertise in critical infrastructure protection, even less those with expertise in cyber infrastructure.
• Second, to the extent that cyber infrastructure specialists exist, they are mostly situated within IT organizational communities, which may or may not be (in)formally coordinated with the state's homeland security apparatus. As a result, we see more chief information security officers advocating for structural arrangements and policies that can effectively bridge "the chasm between the worlds of critical infrastructure protection and cyber protection."
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• Third, states have demonstrated both reluctance and enthusiasm to elevate cybersecurity as a major priority and to engage legislatively or administratively on issues of cybersecurity. For some, a lack of coherent guidance and intergovernmental funding from appropriate federal agencies is a serious hindrance. For others, a bottom-up approach that places state cybersecurity professionals at the forefront of decision making and dialogue is preferable. However, this approach is rife with difficulties. Challenges include overcoming authority and status barriers between federal and state experts on matters of policy (elite-actor bias), and securing two-way communication that reaches beyond symbolism to actual participatory governance (participationdeficit).
In spite of their varying viewpoints on these matters, one conclusion drawn from this research is that state CISOs share common concerns over the role and reach of cybersecurity responsibilities. These concerns include:
• Risks associated with potential violations of privacy and civil liberties of citizens.
• Managing problems that could morph in scope and scale from domestic to international significance.
• Risks associated with taking on additional unfunded security mandates.
Despite these challenges, state CISOs have been on the front-end of cybersecurity dialogue, lending expertise to identifying gaps in policies, testing strategies for remediation, and acting as laboratories of innovation for how best to organize to address threats in an evolving cybersecurity environment (Williams, 2009 ).
Ultimately, these challenges and opportunities point to the need for collaboration among local, state, federal, and private partners on matters of cybersecurity, as well as on the articulation of values governing collaborations specific to this task. Effective collaboration and planning will establish links between cyberspace and physical attacks, such as those that may compromise electricity grids, water infrastructure, and air traffic control systems. It will also establish links with informational attacks, including hacking of e-mail systems of agencies like Department of Defense, computer probes of IT systems at NASA and the Transportation Security Agency, and the loss of billions of dollars in intellectual property from the private sector, which weakens economic resilience (CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity, 2008).
As Lieutenant General Harry D. Raduege, Jr., USAF, Ret., has noted, technology leaders face a "challenging and demanding business," where the "rewards for success are great and dangers for failure are significant" Building on a 2009 study of the role of the chief information security officer in higher education , this report identifies roles, responsibilities and skill sets of current state chief information security officers. In addition, the report describes the varied strategies used by states to engage their diverse communities on cybersecurity issues. Twenty-nine states were included in the study by participating in an electronic survey, in-person interviews, or phone interviews (Appendix I includes a full description of the research design). This report points to the broad array of concerns for cybersecurity professionals resulting in the need for both technical and leadership skill sets. It is clear that collaboration is a key element in successful implementation of cybersecurity programs in the states.
Titles and Responsibilities of State CISOs
Debates about boundaries of the discipline and titles for the top cybersecurity professions in an organization ensued as the profession developed from its beginning in the 1990s. As technology became more complex, all aspects of control and access became potential areas to include within the purview of cybersecurity. Titles changed, but they consistently used combinations of the words "information", "technology", "security" and a word representing an administrative officer (chief, head, director, or officer).
In this report, we found the most common title is that of chief information security officer, often incorporating the word "state" in the title. The majority of CISOs now report directly to the state chief information officer, with a minority reporting to a deputy CIO or an enterprise information systems director. Very few states maintain separate reporting lines for the CISO and the CIO, although it has been argued that separating their roles has the advantage of compartmentalizing operational concerns from security decisions. Table 1 shows data from 18 state CISOs providing responses on their areas of responsibility. CISOs have primary responsibility for data security, incident management, training and awareness, regulation and standards compliance, risk management, and strategy. Given the small number of respondents, it is not prudent to generalize to the universe of cybersecurity personnel. However, data gathered for this report are consistent with both the essential body of knowledge and data gathered from CISOs in the higher education environment 
Skills Needed for Successful CISOs
Responsibilities defined for the position of CISO comprise activities that are technical, managerial and collaborative in nature. Non-technical skills are used by CISOs as they seek cooperation from across state government in building a secure environment. Another CISO painted a picture of a very demanding role requiring a long list of attributes and skills:
Determination, drive, ambition, goal orientation, negotiation, listening, retaining, distilling information, writing skills, editorial skills, likability, sense of humor, dedication, honesty, commitment, accountability, success-orientation, positivity, humility, flexibility, patience, deference to others, consensus building, shared authority, letting people excel without being threatened by their prowess, recognize talent, nurture talent, grow talent, bring out the best in others, thick skin. The emphasis on professionalism for the role is also addressed by the way in which the CISOs establish their authority. CISOs were asked what types of authority they use to establish credibility. Table 3 summarizes responses from the survey. Reference to laws and state policy are important sources on which CISOs relied, but also important are their personal expertise and relationships they have developed over time. These responses demonstrate there is no single path to garnering credibility for the CISO role; rather, complex arrays of expertise (both technical and managerial) and relationships (based on professionalism and trust) are needed to succeed.
Collaboration and Networks
The ability to collaborate across organizational boundaries was also reported as important in the CISO role. CISOs recounted that they frequently or very frequently coordinate with or collaborate with IT staff in other agencies, non-IT staff in other agencies, and with the private sector, including IT vendors.
8
CISOs see communication and conflict management skills as critical to these endeavors, but also highlight the ability to put personal issues aside in the process. One respondent cited "flexibility and patience" as important while another mentioned "humility; understanding you can't do this job alone. Being able to submit your will to that of the group." Given the complexity of the cybersecurity landscape and the importance of relationship-building in the CISO role, this report places a specific emphasis on collaboration, exploring a major theory in the development and success of networks and how they are relevant to cybersecurity programs. Provan and Kenis (2007) , in their work on the effectiveness of networks, discuss the need for leaders to develop competencies that relate to the management of networks. They postulate that in networks where there is significant interdependence among members, there is a need for coordination skills in addition to task-specific competencies. As this report documents, the work of the CISO is highly collaborative: within Table 4 provides a detailed look at which indicators would signal effective behavior in these areas.
In our interviews with CISOs, they outline approaches to working with state agencies in ways that reflect many of the behaviors outlined in table 4. In the category of demonstrating empathy, CISOs provided several examples of reaching out to understand others' perspectives, particularly in the area of policy development. They report numerous instances where personal relationships among colleagues enabled them to move their programs forward despite organizational constraints.
A number of CISOs reported focusing on the motivation of those in other agencies to gain their cooperation with and collaboration on cybersecurity programs. It is clear that CISOs attempt to understand agency priorities and seek compliance through a variety of motivational strategies; several examples are described in the case studies in this report. Appealing to a sense of shared responsibility was also reported as a successful strategy to elicit cooperation.
Also related to collaboration, CISOs report a practical approach to cybersecurity incidents; they indicate that they try not to make the investigation about blame, but instead about learning from what went wrong. In a similar vein, credit for successes was shared; CISOs focused on making successful programs into the driving force for change. This inclusive sense of sharing both responsibility and achievement appears to be a critical skill set in gaining cooperation.
Altruistic perspectives on resource sharing are apparent in the broad cybersecurity community. From early in the development of the profession, wide sharing of information about security incidents was common. The state CISOs clearly exemplify this in their approach today, sharing information without an explicit expectation of a return on the investment.
Seeking to "span boundaries" has become second nature to many CISOs given that cybersecurity itself knows no boundaries. CISOs increasingly see including all relevant players as critical to the effort to combat hackers who move seamlessly across organizational boundaries.
CISOs have naturally developed collaborative competencies in response to the needs of their organizations and the evolving challenges of the technological environment. It is clear that such collaborative skills have become essential to the role of the CISO. The next section explores the elements necessary to make those collaborations successful.
CYBERSECURITY MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES: THE EMERGING ROLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICERS
Cybersecurity clearly fits the definition of a "tangled" problem as discussed by Dawes et al. (2009) , an issue far beyond routine and yet not as difficult to approach as "wicked" problems whose solutions are far from apparent. Cybersecurity issues require state governments to engage a broad array of players, across a number of organizational and sector boundaries to achieve common goals that comprise multifaceted (technical, policy, and behavioral) approaches to change. While securing states' data and systems is far from routine, state IT communities have developed well-defined approaches to many basic elements of cybersecurity.
As states explore this "tangled" problem, they have chosen different areas to emphasize. Differences in state culture, resources, political environment, and size have resulted in a variety of strategies aimed toward keeping state data and systems safe. Case studies from five states highlight these different approaches.
Five Strategies Used by State Cybersecurity Officers
Data from the survey and case studies indicate there are five broad strategies utilized by state-level CISOs to advance their security programs. States are engaging in a common set of activities in relation to cybersecurity, but vary in the emphasis placed on each strategy. The strategies are:
• Strategy One: Development of policy and legal frameworks Strategy One: Development of policy and legal frameworks. One of the most common strategies is the development of cybersecurity policies and assessment tools. All the states that responded to the survey have implemented IT governance structures that include a variety of stakeholders as recommended by Heiman (2002) . As CISOs have worked within their governance structure to develop policy they have often gained the buy-in of stakeholders as well as developed robust policy.
Many states have implemented standards or procedures which provide more specific guidance for the implementation of the cybersecurity policies that are in place. The use of more specific standards or procedures to implement policies provides the option for adaptation as technology changes without having to change underlying policy. Many states require regular assessments or audits to document compliance (or non-compliance) with cybersecurity policies, procedures, and standards.
CISOs noted the importance of these strong policy environments, since they shift the responsibility for cybersecurity and the responsibility for data protection to other agencies. This allows CISOs and their staff to approach agencies by offering assistance instead approaching them from a dictating compliance stance; security as a "service" then becomes possible. In a few states, these policies have the force of law, providing an even firmer base for the CISO to ensure compliance.
Case Studies of State Strategies for Cybersecurity
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A Holistic Approach
Security involves more than just IT. Holistic security is about physical security, disaster preparedness, emergency response, and critical infrastructure protection. Security requires multi-level cooperation and coordination of military, law enforcement, and subject-matter experts. Security touches auditors, facilities managers, and maintenance workers.
Security management begins with the adoption of security policies that have legitimacy within the enterprise. Security policies come from a process that builds consensus among many key stakeholders. This includes elected officials and other policy makers as well as end users, government employees, and citizens. Security policies should embody standard practices that everyone in the organization must follow. These standard practices include an understanding of specific outcomes or goals the enterprise is committed to achieve. These goals are critical to security planning and critical to assessments about how well the organization protects its assets.
Once security policies and standard practices have been agreed upon, the organization is ready to conduct a security risk assessment. The assessment documents the "as is" and compares the "as is" to the standard practices embodied in policies. The comparison yields a gap. Gaps are important because they point to initiatives. These "gap closing" initiatives are prioritized and become a part of the enterprise's long-as well as short-range security plans. After the initiatives are implemented, audits should be done to make sure the gaps are closed and the standard practices are followed. These audits also help organizations stay compliant to policies and standard practices. In addition, security audits and standard practices are key to creating IT enterprise security architectures. These architectures include design principles for building highly integrated and secure IT infrastructures and applications. Also, standard practices, audits, and security "gap" analyses are critical for establishing IT performance metrics. In fact, the best way to determine if security gaps have been closed and stay closed is through the use of metrics.
Finally, intrusions and vulnerabilities should be closely monitored via automated and manual security technologies. Effective IT security cannot be managed with "guess-timates" or in an environment where responsible parties are too afraid to admit shortcomings. Once standard practices and metrics are in hand, the public-sector CIO is in a position to develop a compelling business case that points from the "as is" to the "to be" state of security, which will assure policy makers and stakeholders that security investments will be effective.
Many government systems provide essential services that touch citizens in a highly direct and personal way. These essential services are part of the nation's critical infrastructure. This makes IT security a key aspect of our nation's homeland security. Therefore, as metric data are gathered, it should be shared confidentially among the states and their federal partners. This will require a forum that fosters open sharing of case studies and lessons learned. We must develop a community of public-sector cyberemergency responders to work with public safety, health, and emergency-management professionals.
Again, security done well is a way of life. For each of us to be secure, we must radically alter the way we live and the way we conduct our affairs. Radical-that is, fundamental-change is difficult because it challenges our traditional paradigms and our assumptions surrounding the way we live and work. Radical change for the ancient Greeks required a metanoia-a deep change of heart. September 11th made apparent the need to change our way of life, and the events of that day call us to a new epistemology-a metanoia that redefines what we mean by security and personal responsibility. Government leaders must set aside the "federated" cultures that foster agency autonomy and "my turf" thinking. We must share information, be more watchful, and become more disciplined in how we manage our affairs in community. We must also change our language about security. Security is more than "being safe." It is about justice and selfworth. It is about our dignity. Security is a way of life. This report will serve as a high-level guide for this new way of living. Dawes et al. (2009) write that, in order to successfully approach tangled problems, organizations need to create, lead, and participate in public sector knowledge networks (PSKNs) that are characterized not by a "need to know" information sharing environment but instead a "need to share" environment. Such networks treat the sharing of information and best practices as a primary purpose for existing and focus on sharing processes, practices, software, and other information technologies. Participating networks benefit from more timely, better quality, and more complete information by drawing on collective knowledge.
Within information sharing networks, some "elements of knowledge are explicit, formal, and embodied in easily accessible media or artifacts, and databases," while other elements are embedded in social context and more likely to be conveyed through practice (Dawes et al. 2009, 394) . There is a broad array of information being exchanged by CIOs, CISOs, and their staffs within cybersecurity collaborative networks. Much cybersecurity planning information is explicit and is conveyed through policies, best practices, and standards, thus becoming codified. It is this type of information that is being freely exchanged across organizations and sectors. By contrast, a more dynamic environment exists for the exchange of threat information. The exchange of very current information concerning threats illustrates the sophistication of the cybersecurity collaborations. At the initial stages of identifying a security threat, the information that is exchanged is explicit, but has yet to be fully embedded in context. Questions as to the exact nature of the threat, the technical environments that are vulnerable, and the implications for systems and data are addressed as technical investigations yield results. Information begins with sketchy elements of data; then, through quick and dynamic processes of technical investigation and data exchange, threat information develops into explicit, embedded, and contextualized knowledge about the vulnerability, which then becomes relevant to a subset of players who have that particular vulnerability. The capability that the cybersecurity community has developed with data exchange in these systems is quite sophisticated.
Another aspect of knowledge networks is the challenge of bridging not only formal boundaries of organizations but also informal boundaries erected and protected by ideology and professional norms. This study shows the development of a community among CISOs firmly based on common need and practice, thereby demonstrating the value and efficacy of such cross-governmental collaboration. The development of professional norms within the cybersecurity community has created boundary-spanning networks and capacities within and across the states (and local governments), which are successfully challenging more formal boundaries of government and jurisdiction. It appears the development of formal and informal networks as well as interpersonal relationships are now being deployed to overcome formal organizational boundaries. The development of these relationships is a key element in the successful approach to cybersecurity by the states.
Our study found that the state CISO community has formed and found great value from a number of knowledge networks. CISOs have built these networks both internal to their states (intraorganizational) and across levels of government and sectors (interorganizational). CISOs are spending significant time coordinating groups of IT staff from agencies within their states. In addition, CISOs are participating in a number of regional and national groups focused on the overall improvement of cybersecurity practice that include all levels of government (although Kansas appears to be unique given the heavy involvement of the higher education sector). Groups collaborating across sectors, both formally and informally, are also common.
Case Studies of State Strategies California
The Person and Position Mark Weatherford became the chief information security officer (CISO) of California in 2008 in the midst of widespread policy reform directed towards alleviating the state's pending $40 billion budget deficit. Where this fiscal environment would represent a formidable challenge for any top public manager, Weatherford has characterized the timing and urgency of these circumstances, among others, as a unique policy window of opportunity to affect meaningful reform for cybersecurity in his state, across other states, and at the federal level of governance.
In his position as CISO, Weatherford is primarily responsible for developing policy to ensure the security and confidentiality of the state's information assets. Appointed by the governor, Weatherford brings more than 20 years of experience in information security from his time in the U.S. Navy as well as the private sector and most recently his tenure as Colorado's first CISO. These experiences each afforded him the chance to create new policies and effectively adapt to implementation constraints while always keeping an eye towards future needs and strategic planning. These skills made him particularly compatible with California's goal to revolutionize government functions, especially those aimed at how information technology resources improve the relationship between California and its citizens. 14 Weatherford has served in advisory and leadership capacities within these organizations, often lending expertise to help lay out policy direction and facilitate the diffusion of workable information security policies across state and local boundaries. Weatherford is also able to influence national level discussions on the role of cybersecurity officers, as these voluntary organizations coordinate information and policy with officials at the Department of Homeland Security.
The Strategy
Colorado
The Person and Position Seth Kulakow, Colorado's chief information security officer since November 2008, is a believer in both technology and centralization in his approach to cybersecurity. The power of that combination has the potential to make a substantial difference to the cyber safety profile of the state of Colorado, moving it to a mature cybersecurity organization. His vision of technology allows easy and cost-effective compliance for agencies and governmental organizations in the state and is on its way toward implementation. He has plenty of backing from CIO Michael Locatis and from Governor Bill Ritter in his quest to execute his vision.
The CISO position is defined by state law. 15 The statutes also outline a full program for cybersecurity for all three branches of government, leaving out only higher education. A comprehensive set of policies 16 back up the law and provide specific guidance for state agencies and organizations on cybersecurity issues. Kulakow is putting into place a comprehensive vision for security, a plan that utilizes multiple standards to move forward in security issues. The plan is uniquely presented in visual format in a VISIO diagram. It begins at a foundation level, outlining all the requirements which are needed for any program and then builds to a policy and procedure level. Three additional layers of analysis are added: interior, exterior, and repeatable actions. This defense-in-depth process then moves to a spreadsheet format for analysis of priorities and cost. This approach provides a comprehensive view of cybersecurity investments and accomplishments across the state.
The Strategy
This strong policy foundation allows Colorado's Office of Cyber Security (OCS) to focus on assisting the agencies and governmental organizations to comply with the law and policies. An important part of this focus is on removing risk from the local environment. As Kulakow notes, "If you look at it as a threat, when you have determined the risk to the organization, the best way to mitigate that risk is to not hold onto that risk. So if you can put that risk off to someone else who is ready to obtain it and take it and make it work, it makes sense." 17 Thus, his goal for the OCS is creating a pathway to execute a mature security program. That pathway includes consolidation of IT services and offering cost-effective standard solutions.
Strong support from the governor and the CIO on cybersecurity issues has been important in the development of the cybersecurity program in Colorado. The development of a statutory framework and a plan for cybersecurity was complemented by the work of CIO Michael Locatis on the initiative Colorado Consolidation. This initiative to consolidate information technology services in the state came first through an Executive Order and was then codified in state law (Centralize IT Management In OIT, Colorado Revised Statutes, 2008, §24-37.5-401-404).
The State of Colorado Consolidation Plan (C2P) called for "centralized information technology management, purchasing, spending, and planning" and its goal, now nearing completion, is to "create a statewide enterprise structure compared with today's department-by-department model" (Governor's Office of Information Technology 2008, 6). The consolidation of services and the implementation of enterprise solutions is a key factor in the Colorado security strategy. Kulakow notes, "[W]hen you have 30 years of inefficient silos of IT-as most states have-and IT staff who have worked in that environment for between 10 and 20 years, there can be a lag in technology. In addition, the involvement of so many contractors with so many pieces of software delivering single solutions, it presents a complex challenge."
18 However, if a security program can provide enterprise solutions delivered over a common network, consolidation can save money. This dual emphasis on consolidation of services and providing cost effective enterprise solutions is bearing fruit in the Colorado environment. 
Overview of Strategy:
The Colorado focus on centralization and the use of technology to address cybersecurity issues provides an example of a more technology-focused strategy. While a comprehensive program is in place, the emphasis of the Colorado Office of Cyber Security is to provide easy, inexpensive solutions to the entire state along with the ability to gather data to assess environments with a cross-agency statewide capability. While it is clear that not all states are able to achieve the consolidation of IT services that Colorado is implementing, Kulakow points out that the use of technical tools to look across technical environments together with security metrics devised from standards have the potential to move governments to a mature security environment.
Kulakow
leaders are able to move forward to address cybersecurity issues. Kulakow notes, " [A] gencies can see the gains of not having a silo and not having to worry about their data; it streamlines the overall operational functions of the agencies. For a silo department to do the entire security program with so few people, it is really unachievable."
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The consolidation strategy leads to cost savings that can be invested in sharing technology across the entire state and with other states. Further, this centralization creates an approach that makes extensive use of technical tools. The Colorado OSC has taken advantage of low cost and free automated tools to provide detailed metrics about the Colorado security environment. Using a combination of NESSUS scanner software 20 and the audit tools 21 of the Center for Internet Security, a nonprofit organization that provides resources for measuring information security, it is possible to gather data on all Colorado systems in the executive branch in a cost-effective way. Kulakow makes the argument that open source and other widely available tools such as these provide the opportunity for all governmental organizations to make a major leap toward "a truly mature security organization."
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Delaware
The Person and the Position Elayne Starkey, chief security officer for the State of Delaware since 2005, is responsible for protecting Delaware's information assets from high consequence events, including cyber and physical terrorism and disasters. A large part of her job is educating her peers and customers about ways to prevent, detect, and respond to these events. Starkey's position was created in response to the growing need in Delaware State Government to provide a governance structure for information security, disaster recovery, and business continuity. She hit the ground running, quickly implementing a number of education and awareness initiatives intended to foster an enterprise-level climate of ownership and accountability for the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets.
While Starkey acknowledges that strong IT skills are a must, she says that basic business and communication skills are also important for chief security officers: "We have to influence decisions and projects that aren't always under our span of control. We need to establish relationships with our peers throughout state organizations and make sure they understand the importance of security."
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The Strategy
Starkey uses a number of techniques to remind state employees about the importance of protecting citizen data. Her team publishes a monthly newsletter, hosts training classes, offers policy interpretations, and manages a successful "Latrine Poster Campaign." Every few months, Starkey's office publishes posters that are placed in restrooms throughout the state. The campaign is a lighthearted attempt to get the message about protecting information across in a place where people are likely to stop and pay attention. The campaign, together with other programs, has raised awareness about the importance of information security throughout the organization.
The educational efforts of Starkey's office extend to other citizens of Delaware, as well as state employees. During Cyber Security Awareness Month, her team visits schools and holds assemblies for children to educate them about how to stay safe online. Her office has sponsored travelling billboards on state transit buses, warning citizens about the potential dangers when they go online. Starkey acknowledges that IT staff is not always the best at marketing and business communication, so she taps into the marketing expertise in her department to add a creative flair to the communications.
Delaware At-A-Glance
Top Cybsersecurity Official: Elayne Starkey, Chief Security Officer (CSO) Strategy: Increased education of users on the importance of information security Overview of Strategy: CSO Starkey focused on collaboration and education. Her team uses a number of techniques and tools to point out risks and educate both internal customers and citizens about the risks they face and the cybersecurity techniques they can implement to protect their data. Her office developed a white paper to outline their key targets and metrics.
Starkey
CYBERSECURITY MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES: THE EMERGING ROLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICERS
One of the largest events that Starkey's office hosts each year is an exercise simulating a real world cyber attack on state resources. This year's exercise, nicknamed "Cyber Siege," is the fifth consecutive cybersecurity exercise in Delaware. The exercise planners work closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and use DHS-endorsed tools and best practices. Delaware participates in regional and national level exercises as well, including "Cyber Storm II" in 2008. This large-scale national exercise simulated a combined cyber and physical attack that escalated to a level requiring a coordinated federal response.
Delaware was also involved in a 2009 exercise, "Defend the Flag," sponsored by DHS and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center. Several states participated, attending training on hacker techniques followed by an all-day meleestyle competition, where teams split their time between attacker and defender roles. Starkey's team brought some of the ideas back to Delaware and tweaked them to meet the needs of the state. She admits she does not like to focus on fear tactics to get attention on this topic; rather, Starkey helps her customers become aware of the potential implications of a security breach, which in turn facilitates cooperation with her office.
Whenever possible, Starkey taps into resources at the state and national levels. She also pays attention to what other organizations are using as her office has limited resources for developing new material, and she "does not want to reinvent the wheel. Kettlewell's background illustrates the broad skill sets needed for the successful CISO. Technical, political, policy, and managerial skills combine to provide the CISO the confidence and agility required to respond to each day's issues. In the course of a busy day, the CISO is called upon to move seamlessly from discussing highly technical network protocols with a security staff member, to discussing a citizen phone call with the governor's chief of staff, to reviewing a policy white paper on an emerging security concern, to discussing an important legal issue with the attorney general's office. These activities comprise a typical day for Larry Kettlewell and other CISOs who serve smaller states.
The environment of a smaller state not only results in a broader range of responsibilities for the CISO, but also requires finding ways to share expertise and skill sets across the information technology community; with fewer staff in the information technology security office, sharing expertise is vital to success. And, given the importance of sharing skills sets, information technology governance takes on even more importance as it plays a role in promoting collaboration.
The Strategy
Like other states, Kansas has implemented an information technology governance process that attempts to bring together actors from all three branches of government. However, potentially unique to the Kansas model is the broad reach in that it involves all state governmental sectors, including education. This also leads to broad collaboration for cybersecurity. As Kettlewell notes, " [T] echnology is rapidly overrunning our laws and, more importantly, our government structures," 26 making constant communication and coordination important. The Kansas answer to this challenge is to place a dual focus on technology and policy with the two working together across all governmental sectors.
The foundation of IT governance in Kansas is the Information Technology Executive Council (ITEC). The council "is responsible for approval and maintenance of all information technology policies, IT project management procedures, the statewide technical architecture, and the strategic information management plan," that is, the overall strategic management and planning of the Kansas IT operation (www.da.ks.gov/ITEC/). Seventeen members serve on the council, representing eight areas of government:
• The governor is represented by the secretary of administration.
• Agencies are represented on the council by two cabinet-level agency heads and one non-cabinet agency head, ensuring the perspective of smaller state government agencies.
• Financial issues are represented through the inclusion of the director of the budget.
• The judicial branch is represented by the judicial administrator of the Kansas Supreme Court and the judicial chief information technology officer.
• The Kansas legislative branch is represented by the legislative chief information technology officer.
• Two tiers of education are represented on the council; the commissioner of education represents K-12, and higher education is represented by the president and CEO of the Kansas Board of Regents. Local government is represented by city and county representatives.
• There are representatives from the private sector, in this case three individuals who are either CEOs or CIOs.
• The executive director of a separate organization (the Information Network of Kansas or INK), which advances e-government within the state, is also included in the Council. 
Overview of Strategy:
In Kansas, the governance model provides a framework for collaboration across a broad set of stakeholders in the IT environment, and it is the relationships that really pay off for the state. As in Washington State (discussed below), the development of relationships where trust is established through consistent communication is a key factor in dealing with daily cybersecurity issues. In the security field, over time and through working on various problems or incidents, a circle of "trustees" is developed. Once established, these relationships can last years and are invaluable in dealing with the insignificant-tocritical issues that the enterprise faces on a daily basis. Daily communication and coordination with this circle, and indirectly with the trustees' circle of contacts, brings significant expertise to bear on almost any problem.
Kettlewell
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Technology Policy 3100) The board comprises senior managers of state information technology organizations (mostly CIOs) along with representatives from private industry and local units of government. The current list of members shows involvement from state agencies, the legislative branch (including legislative post audit), the judicial branch of state government, the state division of information systems and communications, K-12 education, all the state institutions of higher education, local government, and law enforcement (such as the Kansas Bureau of Investigation). The broad array of collaborators provides a forum for the development and refinement of information technology policy, including approaches to cybersecurity.
The governance model in Kansas also utilizes a number of specialized offices that provide support to the ITEC. These areas include enterprise architecture, e-government services, identity management, project management, and GIS. Joining these offices is the Information Technology Security Office (ITSC). An Information Technology Security Council reports directly to the Executive Council and "recommends and reviews policies, guidelines, and best practices for the overall security of information technology systems, infrastructure and data within Kansas state government." 27 Similar to the other governance groups in Kansas, the Security Council has broad participation from the Kansas governmental community. Besides the functional agency involvement, there is strong representation from legal and law enforcement agencies (Attorney General's Office, the U.S. Secret Service, the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, Department of Corrections, the Juvenile Justice Authority, and the Highway Patrol). Also present is the education community, both K through 12 and higher education.
The significant involvement of the higher education community is an important component of the Kansas approach and represents the fulfillment of the strategy of reaching out to build on all IT assets in the state. Higher education IT personnel have been heavily involved in the formation of cybersecurity policy and in security awareness and training programs. The Security Council has successfully constructed policies dealing with security and awareness training and in other far-reaching areas. The council has recommended and ITEC has approved such policies as computer incident response, the companion reporting protocols, and media sanitization.
Perhaps the Security Council's most significant program is the annual security self assessment for agencies and departments in the enterprise. The assessment is based on standards promoted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. A newly revised enterprise security policy, which meshes with the security self assessment tool, will be finalized this year. In a parallel development, the State of Kansas has recently engaged in preliminary discussions with the Department of Homeland Security, National Cybersecurity Division, to examine the direction of a national assessment framework. The General Accounting Office's Report to the U.S. House of Representatives (October 2009) identifies the need to conduct cybersecurity assessments at all levels of government by June 2011. While the Kansas Department of Emergency Management focuses on more common natural and other disasters, cybersecurity remains an important topic for this agency, and, as such, monthly coordination meetings and informal contacts are the norm. Recently, informal inclusion into the state's Intelligence Fusion Center has begun.
New York
The Person and the Position William Pelgrin is chief cybersecurity officer for New York State and director of the State Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Coordination (CSCIC). He has served in this capacity since 2002. Pelgrin has more than 26 years in government service, during which he has maintained a long-standing belief in the value of building partnerships to accomplish organizational goals: upward with federal officials; outward with other internal agencies, states outside of New York, and the private sector; and downward to local and municipal officials. As chief cybersecurity officer for the state, he is a peer to the CIO. Both serve at the pleasure of the governor, and are structurally located at the cabinet level of administration.
The genesis of Pelgrin's role as a security official predates September 11, 2001 . Before the terrorist attacks, Pelgrin was New York's chief technology officer, charged with developing an enterprise view of technology for the state and identifying the need for security measures to support the growing e-commerce environment. During this time he was recognized for his commitment to make "programs the driving force CYBERSECURITY MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES: THE EMERGING ROLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICERS of decisions" rather than being strictly beholden to "technical" aspects of problem solving. Pelgrin recalls the shift in focus after the terrorist attacks: "We all began reflecting on how 9/11 impacted us, and impacted me as a government official; I really wanted then to have a more dedicated focus for cybersecurity."
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This vision manifested in a new cybersecurity and critical infrastructure organization for the state.
The Strategy
Pelgrin attributes early success in cybersecurity operations to employing a collaboration model from the onset. He notes, "We always had the attitude of partnerships that resonated with people, resulting in a statutory agency dedicated to cybersecurity for the state separate from daily operational activities." 29 Thus, the CIO was able to manage IT operations while Pelgrin addressed highly specialized needs of security and critical infrastructure.
There are five main communities with which Pelgrin engages in partnerships and networking:
• The political and administrative communities within state government
• The private sector
• The multi-state cybersecurity community
• Local and municipal governments • Entities at the federal level Snapshots of each demonstrate an overall preference for a proactive versus ad hoc approach to building connections and trust, as well as for institutionalizing a view of cybersecurity issues beyond traditional problems of technology.
First, the CSCIC has established credibility with executive and non-executive agencies by offering help in diagnosing compliance with statewide information security policies and laws while also working together with agency-level information security officers to develop remediation plans. This is most evident in the implementation of a compliance reporting system that provides performance information to state agencies on where they stand, a kind of dashboard analysis. Unlike the backlash that frequently accompanies such reporting schemes, Pelgrin and his team have taken great strides to "note the reporting process is not about blame, but rather how we can collectively work together to improve the state's cybersecurity environment." 30 Pelgrin's collaborative approach has made this voluntary reporting effort itself very successful, but more importantly it has led to more effective implementation of information security policies by agencies across the board.
Second, this "collaborative philosophy" has also been a guiding principle when partnering with the private sector. Whereas many information security officials are only now considering whether and how best to collaborate with the private sector, Pelgrin's team, in collaboration with the State Office of Homeland Security, has led a Public/Private Sector Cyber Security Workgroup since 2002. This workgroup takes advantage of the diversified skills and knowledge of its members to "identify and assess vulnerabilities and determine appropriate mitigation strategies." 31 Partners include representatives from the telecommunications, utilities, higher education, public safety, and financial sectors among others. Sector subgroups participate in monthly conference calls to exchange information, and all workgroup participants convene quarterly using webcast technologies.
Third, Pelgrin maintains that a "principled" approach to cybersecurity should reflect a collective mindset as well as recognition of the boundary-free nature of cybersecurity problems. The impetus for reaching out to surrounding states by way of the original Northeast State Homeland Security New York At-A-Glance Top Cybersecurity Official: William Pelgrin, Chief Cybersecurity Officer Strategy: Building collaboration through networking and upward, outward, and downward leadership Overview of Strategy: New York State's cybersecurity strategy is guided by a philosophy of partnership and networking in all directions: upward towards federal officials; outward with state level agencies, multiple state security officials, and the private sector; and downward towards local and municipal governments. Additionally, the strategy includes leveraging a number of venues and interactions to institutionalize a view of cybersecurity which accounts for core competencies beyond those driven narrowly by technology.
Pelgrin
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Directors' Consortium to create the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) is one outcome of this mindset and approach. Pelgrin notes, "I believe the collective view is more powerful than the singular view when developing a structure that can protect the whole perimeter," and to do so requires "an understanding with the governor that my responsibilities are broad and my position knows no geographic or political boundaries."
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With his success working for five governors, as well as leadership and advising of the MS-ISAC, Pelgrin has convincingly merged his understanding of policy demands with the tools of collaboration to respond effectively to his mandate.
Fourth, Pelgrin and his team have been involved in helping other state agencies and local governments understand the dynamic nature of cyber threat environments. They anticipate and respond to requests for help with training, policy direction, and best practices on matters ranging from basic knowledge of cybersecurity solutions to managerial strategies on how to leverage limited personnel, fiscal, and time resources to serve cybersecurity goals. Pelgrin believes these activities serve the statewide mission of achieving cyber readiness and resilience. The work products which help institutionalize cybersecurity as an issue of both management and technology to these various communities include monthly newsletters, a magazine-type guide covering contemporary issues in jargon-free language, regular meetings to receive input on agenda-setting from state and local governments, and working together to define acceptable, workable, and effective "deliverables" to get the job done. The Strategy Washington has a robust policy for cybersecurity which is approved by a statewide Information Services Board and implemented through standards and guidelines. Some controls are centrally provided to everyone while others are implemented by agencies according to their needs and risk assessment. Information Technology Security Policy Standard Compliance Audits are required at least once every three years. In addition to this solid policy and compliance foundation, Jim Albert, DIS deputy of operations, cites the single network infrastructure and the development of security architecture for the entire state as important security assets.
Washington matches these policy and technological approaches with educational and collaborative approaches to cybersecurity. A key focus is building relationships both within the state and with regional and national cybersecurity-related personnel and organizations. "It is really about awareness at all levels," Kirk notes, "It is providing visibility of what happens when security is not incorporated into the business processes." 33 In Washington, the stakeholders within the agencies are regularly engaged with the CISO. The approach is for security to be an enabler of business processes and to build partnerships between agency stakeholders and the CISO. Rather than just saying "no" to technology requests, relationship-building is used to reach a common goal of providing services to the public while appropriately protecting personal or sensitive information.
To help achieve this, there is a statewide Security Council which involves all state agencies. The council is made up of security leads from all state agencies with representation from local government and higher education. Each security lead is responsible for security and incident response within their agency, for coordinated controls implemented consistently across the state's enterprise, and for working in a collaborative fashion during a statewide incident. The members also participate in statewide cyber exercises; the most recent was held in • Working with staff from the Information Services Board on developing guideline documents to assist agencies in implementing the newly adopted IT Security Standards
• Participating on evaluation teams for securityrelated products and services
• Providing speakers at security forums
In addition to working within the state agencies on cybersecurity issues, collaborative relationships have also been built with a broader community of cities, counties, and private sector organizations in the geographic area. The Pacific Northwest CISO group meets on a regular basis, both face-to-face and also via conference calls. This group is made of more than 65 public and private CISOs from a cross section of industries, including health care, insurance, retail, manufacturing, service, telecommunications, and higher education, as well as school districts, cities, counties, and the state. By design, this loosely affiliated organization does not include the vendor community. This venue has been very successful in promoting open communication among the members on issues/challenges, breach information, and requests for assistance during incidents, as well as sharing policies, processes, and recommendations.
The strategy reflected in the Washington approach focuses on relationship building within state government and more broadly with local government and private organizations as a key to cybersecurity. These relationships require: (1) building awareness, (2) respecting the expertise that each party brings to the table, and (3) building trust through interpersonal communication.
Washington At-A-Glance
Top Cybersecurity Official: Agnes Kirk, Chief Information Security Officer
Strategy: Building collaboration with the private sector by developing relationships to serve business needs.
Overview of strategy: Awareness of cybersecurity issues within state agencies is seen as a key first step in ensuring that the resources of the CISO and staff are productively utilized. Recognizing the expertise each party brings to the table is an important part of the process. Marrying business expertise to cybersecurity expertise allows the state to find the best solutions to the inevitable tension between business and security needs. The consistent communication within the group helps maintain the relationships built through the work on business problems.
The broader collaboration across the Northwest uses these same keys in a looser "participate as your needs dictate" organization. The consistent communication and respect for individual expertise brought to the table provides the basis for the collaboration which can then be called upon during stressful incident times. These approaches to collaboration reflect the principles that have been found to be successful by public sector researchers. The State of Washington is an example of effective cybersecurity collaboration.
Kirk
This review of the cybersecurity landscape at the state level provides a broad picture of both strategies used to build successful programs and the activities of the CISO. From our research, we draw the following five key recommendations. Information sharing across boundaries has become the norm for CISOs despite the requirement that sharing information requires spanning a number of state bureaucratic boundaries. By recognizing a shared responsibility, CISOs have created, participated in, and led robust public sector knowledge networks (Dawes et al., 2009 The state cybersecurity community is now on the cusp of adapting and making potentially important and unique contributions to homeland security work. The challenge is whether the current professional culture that now exists within the cybersecurity community will mitigate the development of broader collaboration with those involved in homeland security-related functions. Professional cultures create boundaries; in this case information is embedded in the language of information technology and may not be easily extracted and shared with partners from the other disciplines-law enforcement, emergency management, militaryinvolved in homeland security activities. As Dawes et al. (2009) point out:
For information systems, the knowledge wrapper that holds the logic of data structures, definitions, collection methods, processes, and interpretive schemes is unique to the organizational setting in which it was created. This knowledge may be poorly documented and distributed in ways that make it difficult to aggregate and share (396).
Research indicates that such cultural accommodation among homeland security players will be an important step in making true collaboration possible. Research on network development indicates that the development of specific projects within small but cross-discipline networks has the potential to build trusting relationships and expand the reach of the cybersecurity community out to the broader security community. Ensuring that the diversity of participants' perspectives is recognized will be an important element in the successful cultivation of these networks. Given that approaches to cybersecurity are generally collaborative in nature, to be successful a CISO must possess and deploy competencies of collaboration relevant to the task at hand. While CISOs recognize the strong need for non-technical skills, it is important to focus such skill development on those areas which hold the most promise for success at collaboration. As noted earlier, Getha-Taylor's (2008) study of successful collaborators found that interpersonal understanding and teamwork/cooperation were the most important to their success. Yet the development of these skills, which appear to come with experience and maturity, may be less likely to be encouraged than more tangible technical skills. The development of these skills, and the trust within a collaborative network that goes with them, is an important goal in and of itself if long-term collaborations are to be built within the cybersecurity community. The concept of data management did not emerge as a major focus for the state CISOs. This report, however, shows that state governments are now moving beyond a merely technical control approach to security work to a focus on the importance of gaining the cooperation of technology users and the development of effective business processes. As noted earlier in this report, some CISOs believe that the defined network perimeter has dissolved and that the future of cybersecurity is a focus on data management • Personnel Security: controls to ensure proper personnel selection and the prevention and detection of employee-caused security breaches
• Physical and Environmental Security: methods of protecting physical facilities from natural or man-made threats
• Procurement: policies and procedures required to plan, apply and evaluate the purchase of IT products and services
• Regulatory and Standards Compliance: policies and procedures that enable an organization to meet information security laws, regulations, and standards
• Security Risk Management: policies and procedures used to identify and assess risks and balance with costs of mitigating the risk.
• Strategic Security Management: practices and methods involved in making managerial decisions in relation to IT security planning
• Systems and Application Security: policies and procedures to integrate information security into IT system development
The Essential Body of Knowledge assigns the primary responsibility for most of these roles to the chief information security officer and assigns supporting roles for others.
This study relied on a mixed methodology framework. Utilizing semi-structured interviews and an online survey, the researchers mixed qualitative and quantitative approaches to provide in-depth information about chief information security officers (CISOs) at the state level.
Pre-Survey Interviews
The study began with pre-survey interviews conducted in the summer of 2009. These interviews focused on strategies CISOs used to establish their credibility and implement policies as well as information about CISOs' backgrounds and positions. The researchers reached out to a mix of large, medium, and small states for pre-survey interviews. The interviews were semi-structured and conversational in tone. The flexibility of the semi-structured format allowed the CISOs to focus on what they felt was most important for their positions. All interviews were conducted via telephone and all were transcribed and analyzed by members of the research team.
Online Survey
Preliminary findings from the pre-survey interviews were used to complete development of two online surveys: one for CISOs and one for CIOs. The surveys were constructed using information on the CISO role from a previous study two of the authors conducted on CISOs in the higher education community, the Department of Homeland Security Essential Body of Knowledge, and outlines of parameters for successful collaboration from public administration literature. The CISO survey focused on the background, credentials, and strategies used to implement policies and collaborations. The CIO survey focused on security planning and strategies used to implement policies and collaborations. The researchers established an informal network of CISOs and practitioners from leading professional organizations to assist with pre-testing the survey. In addition to invaluable feedback concerning the survey's questions and length, these individuals also helped spread the word about the survey in the cyber security community. 
Follow-up Interviews
At the conclusion of the survey, CISOs were asked to volunteer to be a part of follow-up interviews. The protocol for these interviews was established from preliminary results of the survey. Like the presurvey interviews, these were semi-structured and conversational in tone; they took place by phone and included a mix of large, medium, and small states. Additionally, interviews included states that have both long and newly established CISO positions. The follow-up interviews allowed CISOs to expand on responses they provided in surveys, focusing on: strategies they use in establishing their credibility and performing their jobs, and formal and informal collaborations they participate in.
The researchers chose six states to highlight in case studies in the report. All quotes and cases were approved by the CISOs for use in the report. Her research and teaching interests include law and society as they apply to public bureaucracies. She is particularly interested in the influence of growing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in public employment and how it affects the meanings of law and rules for public officials. She is a qualitative researcher whose particular proficiency is in narrative and conversational analysis and interviewing. She has recently completed research on the mobilization of rules and laws by public officials, which will appear in Law & Social Inquiry, and on gender and organizational rule abidance, which appeared in Public Administration Review. Her work primarily focuses on informal (social) and formal (legal) influences on organizational actors' behavior.
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